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The Impact of Totalitarian Rule on Contemporary European 









The influence of multiple totalitarian regimes has resulted in the Latvia of today becoming a multi-
ethnic society. The reinstatement of Latvia’s outdated 1922 constitution following independence from the 
Soviet Union in 1991, failed to deal with the demographic changes that had taken place under Soviet 
rule. Notably, protections for minority groups were given no constitutional, nor subsequent legislative 
backing. This was only partially addressed under the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria requirement on 
minority protections as part of the accession process. As the situation was not fully dealt with during 
accession, the language rights of minorities of Latvia continue to be impacted on. This article examines 
paradoxes in EU policy towards minority languages. It is argued that given this historic context, the 
current system of EU languages is discriminatory and unduly impacts on the linguistic rights of a large 




From its driving role in international conflicts, to its horrifying impact on the lives of 
millions, modern totalitarian rule is one of the twentieth century’s most defining 
ideologies. Totalitarian rule has held a central role in shaping modern Latvian history. 
This is most obviously true of Latvia’s forced annexation under the Soviet Union (1940-
1941 and 1945-1991), and equally clear in its brief period of Nazi rule (1941-1945). 
Perhaps more surprisingly, momentum towards totalitarian rule can equally be detected 
in Latvia’s interwar independence earlier in the century. As a consequence of this rule, a 
distinct ethnic divide in Latvia is now present. The most obvious public manifestation of 
this divide is visible through Latvian national language policy. This paper examines the 
impact of this inescapable history of totalitarian rule on Latvia’s contemporary social 
and political landscape, especially its 2004 integration into the European Union (EU). 
 
Drawing on the historic justifications for contemporary policies towards ethnic 
minorities in Latvia, this paper argues that current Latvian, and to a greater extent, EU 
policies do little to address the legacy of linguistic and ethnic pluralism that totalitarian 
rule left. With language often being described as a core element of national identity,2
                                                          
1 Leigh Kamolins is a candidate for a Masters of European and International Studies at Monash University and has 
recently completed study and research abroad towards this degree at King’s College London. He holds a Bachelor of 
Arts with majors in history and politics from Monash University. Leigh also works as a Project Officer in the Strategic 
Projects section of the Office of Police Integrity in Victoria, and was Human Rights Ambassador for the Victorian 
Department of Justice in 2009. 
 
2 For example, A. Caviedes, 'The Role of Language in Nation-Building within the European Union', Dialectical 
Anthropology, Vol. 27, Nos.3/4, 2003, p.249; S. Wright, Community and Communication: The role of language in 
nation state building and European integration, Clevedon, Multilingual Matters Ltd, 2000, p.121. 
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this paper further contends that, given Latvia’s historic circumstances, the current 
system of official languages in the EU causes de facto discrimination, unduly impacting 
on the linguistic rights of a large proportion of the Latvian and broader EU population. 
 
The Historic Precedence 
 
Alongside national aspirations, Latvia has historically enacted discriminatory public 
policy. It is an irony of the Latvian political landscape that such policies have too been 
core in occupiers’ attempts to assert their versions of hegemony over the local 
population. Although a Latvian national consciousness first began to emerge in the late 
nineteenth century,3 discriminatory ultra-nationalist policy only developed under 
totalitarian rule in the mid-late 1930s. The emergence of discriminatory attitudes and 
their manifestation in public policy was supported and reinforced by the constitution. 
This stance toward ethnic minorities is typical of totalitarian led societies who reject 
“toleration, pluralism and the open society.”4 Of the lack of protection for minority 
groups in the Latvian constitution, James Pollock noted in 1923 that ‘There is very little 
reason why racial or religious difficulties should arise, since the large majority of the 
population are Letts and belong to the Lutheran Church’.5
 
 
Pollock’s claim was inaccurate, as there was a significant minority ethnic population. 
Between 1885 and 1897, under the rule of imperial Russian leader Tsar Alexander III, a 
process of ‘Russification’ had taken place.6 Additionally, Germans had been 
economically, politically and socially influential in Latvia over a 700 year history of 
dominance and social oppression over the local population.7 In 1935, the Germans were 
a small, but influential minority, comprising 3.2 per cent of the population.8 The state 
was multi-ethnic, comprising significant proportions of Polish, Roma and other 
minority groups.9 Andres Kasekamp indicates that it was such ethnic minorities, 
totalling almost a quarter of the population when combined, who held disproportionate 




The influence of these groups was evident in the fact that many minority schools existed, 
maintained by state funds, and so too, numerous allowances were being made for the 
use of minority languages in administrative and legal.11
                                                          
3 A. Pabriks & A. Purs, Latvia: The Challenges of Change, London, Routledge, 2001, pp.1-2. 
 After dissolving the saeima 
4 A. Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction 4th Edition, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.217. 
5 J. K. Pollock, ‘The constitution of Latvia’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1923, p.448. 
6 J.W. Hidden, ‘The Baltic Germans and German policy towards Latvia after 1918’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 13, 
No. 2, 1970, p.295; A. Plakans, ‘Democratization and political participation in post communist societies: The case of 
Latvia’, in K. Dawisha & B. Parrott (eds), The consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.100-101. 
7 M. M. Laserson, ‘The recognition of Latvia’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1943, 
p.236. 
8 D. S. Eglitis, Imagining the nation: History, modernity, and revolution in Latvia, University Park, The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, p.108. 
9 G. Hogan-Brun, et al., ‘Language politics and practices in the Baltic States’, Current Issues in Language Planning, 
Vol. 8, No. 4, 2007, p.8. 
10 A. Kasekamp, ‘Radical right-wing movements in the North-East Baltic’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 34, 
No. 4, 1999, p.594. 
11 Hogan-Brun, et al., op cit., p.9. 
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(Parliament) and seizing total rule in a 1934 coup d’état, Latvian leader Karlis Ulmanis 
became particularly concerned by the high proportion of property and other capital 
controlled by those not ethnically Latvian. His right-wing ultra-nationalist policies 
eliminated higher education teaching in the traditional languages of German and 
Russian, replacing them with Latvian.12 This resulted in those of German, Russian and 
Jewish descent being squeezed out of positions of political and economic influence, with 
preferential treatment given to Latvians.13 This was a ‘textbook’ case of Ernest Gellner’s 
theories on the emergence of nationalism in what was by all accounts an agrarian society 
in transition. That is, emphasis was placed on an education system and high culture, 
protected by the state, and supposedly endorsed by the populace.14 It was, however, 
those of German descent who were the subject of any real animosity in Latvia due to 
their historic hegemony over the local population.15 Equivalent discriminatory policy 
also emerged during this period in other fascist states in Europe. It is well documented 
that during the 1930s Germany began to enact public policy which favoured ethnic 
Germans.16 However, when “compared to the other dictatorships in the world, his 
[Ulmanis’] was truly mild.”17
 
 While Latvia’s nationalistic policies were comparable to 
those enacted in many other European states during the 1930s, their resurrection in 
post-Soviet Latvia was to become a significant complicating factor in the 
democratisation process and causing discord in the European integration process. 
Three days after the fall of Paris to Nazi Germany and in line with the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet military commenced occupation of Latvia on 17 June 1940. 
Soviet provocateurs organised mass marches and meetings designed to create the 
impress of the beginnings of a popular uprising. ‘Official’ Soviet accounts described it as 
the “overthrow” of “the hated fascist government”, bringing “the age long aspirations of 
the Latvian people” into being.18 A staged election with only one candidate brought to 
power the saiema which soon after voted unanimously for Latvia to become part of the 
USSR.19 Following this, a relatively short period of Nazi occupation from 1941-1944 was 
followed by Soviet occupation once again, sending approximately 120-150,000 Latvians 
to seek exile in the West.20
 
  
Under Soviet rule another intensive process of ‘Russification’ took place, which 
significantly eclipsed that earlier undertaken by Imperial Russia. In the 1940s, for 
example, over 50,000 of Latvia’s educated elite were deported to Siberia.21
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
 In 1945, 
13 A. Plakans, The Latvians: A short history, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1995, p.135. 
14 E. Gellner, Nations and nationalism, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983, pp.8-14. 
15 A. Ezergailis, The Holocaust in Latvia, 1941-1944: The Missing Center, The Historical Institute of Latvia, Riga, 
1996, p.80. 
16 See for example, C. Browning, ‘The decision-making process’, in D. Stone (ed), The Historiography of the 
Holocaust, London:,Routledge, 2004, pp174-175; H. Friedlaender, ‘Step by step: The expansion of murder, 1939-41’, 
in O. Bartov (ed.), The Holocaust: Origins, Implementation, Aftermath, London, Routledge, 2000, pp.65-67; M. 
Burleigh & W. Wippermann, ‘The ‘uniqueness’ of Nazi racialism’, in A. A. Kallis (ed.), The Fascism Reader, London, 
Routledge, 2003, pp.335. 
17 J. Dreifelds, Latvia in transition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.30. 
18 J. Kalnberzins, Ten Years of Soviet Latvia, Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1951, p.7. 
19 Plakans, The Latvians: A short history, op cit., p.144-145; Eglitis, op cit., p.6. 
20 M. Grunts, Latvians in exile in the free world 1940-1980, London: M.V. Grunts (self published), c.1980, p.1. 
21 V. Nollendorfs, & U. Neiburgs, Soviet mass deportations from Latvia, Latvijas Instituts, 2006, 
<http://www.li.lv/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=142>, accessed 23 August 2008. 
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Latvians comprised close to 80 per cent of the local population, dropping to 52 percent 
by 1989.22 Although a national resistance existed until the 1950s, all political parties 
other than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were banned. Farms and industry 
were collectivised. The use of the Latvian language was curbed, and the display of the 
Latvian national flag was forbidden.23 In the Baltic States, the Russian language was 
termed by the Soviet occupiers to be “the language of friendship of nations.”24
 
 The 
hidden subtext of this was an aim to destroy the local languages, which had been 
identified by the occupiers as a key element in national identity. 
Language has historically been used as a control mechanism by European totalitarian 
regimes to reinforce the dominance of the state’s nationality. This was explicitly the case 
in Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany.25 The Soviet Union’s foundational Marxist-
Leninist ideology however, purported to define groupings of people by class rather than 
nation. The Soviet Union spoke of there being 130 equal languages in the USSR.26 While 
this remained the official stance, from 1958 Russian became the lingua franca of the 
entire USSR.27
 
 All public administration was conducted in Russian, as was all academic 
discourse. Unsurprisingly, suppression of the national minority occurred alongside such 
restrictive language policy. 
Ironically, Communist propaganda used Latvia’s brief periods of fascist rule and Nazi 
occupation to undermine international criticism of their own illegitimate occupancy. 
Implying that their occupation of Latvia had been a matter of choice, one 1965 Soviet 
‘academic’ publication described a lobby group of East European refugees in America as 
“Nazi collaborationists” with the aim of casting “rude slander on their countries who 
decided to go socialist [emphasis added].”28 Soviet representations of lobbyist ‘political 
refugees’ depicted them as charlatans “spreading false information and outright lies 
about the Socialist countries” to grow “rich at the expense of their fellow exiles, 
thousands of Latvians abroad [who] live under hard conditions.”29 When referring to 
the Western call for Latvian “freedom and rights”, the authors of this State published 
text claimed that this actually meant “the freedom and right to repeat the previous Nazi 
barbarities.”30
 
 Such Soviet propaganda uses Latvia’s totalitarian history to filter the 
brutal nature of their own regime.  
                                                          
22 A. Sprudz, ‘Rebuilding democracy in Latvia: Overcoming a dual legacy’, in J. Zielonka (ed.), Democratic 
consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume I: Institutional engineering, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.140; 
E. Stern, et al., ‘Crisis management in transitional democracies: The Baltic experience’, Government and Opposition, 
Vol. 37, No.4, 2002, p.530. 
23 Nollendorfs & Neiburgs, op. cit. 
24 Eesti Instituut, Estonica: Russification, undated, 
<http://www.estonica.org/eng/lugu.html?kateg=43&menyy_id=99&alam=61&leht=11>, accessed 1 October 2008. 
25 M. Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, London, Routledge, 1994, p.4; J. J. Linz, Totalitarian and 
Authoritarian Regimes, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2000, p.5. 
26 For example, M. I. Isaev, One hundred and thirty with equal rights: On languages of the peoples of the USSR, 
Moscow, Nauka, 1970. 
27 L. A. Grenoble and A. Lenore , Language policy in the Soviet Union, New York, Springer, 2003. 
28 J. Silabriedis & B. Arklans, ‘Political refugees’ unmasked!, Riga, Latvian State Publishing House, 1965, p.189. 
29 Ibid., p.209. 
30 Ibid., p.212. 
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The Inter-War Legacy Revived 
 
When Latvia regained independence following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
constitution of 1922 was reinstated. Many Western powers had not recognized de jure 
the annexation of Latvia,31 therefore the constitution’s re-adoption emphasised the 
continuity of the state.32 Despite the constitution allowing the conditions for the rise of 
totalitarian rule in the inter-war period, its adoption of this constitution was a case of 
“choosing what seemed to be a lesser evil.”33 The Latvian Prime Minister continues to 
hold the same powers which gave way to Karlis Ulmanis’ seizure of total rule in 1934. In 
this respect, Andrejs Plakans describes that “The authoritarian period in the interwar 
republic… is a silent but nevertheless eloquent reminder that the Latvian state had 
already experienced one failure of parliamentary democracy”.34 Ilze Koroleva and Ritma 
Rungule cautiously note that the elderly in particular, are nostalgic towards the ‘golden 
years’ of independent interwar Latvian under the Ulmanis regime.35 Unlike in Russia 
where there has been a tendency for younger generations to idealise the certainty and 
social order of their Soviet past, Latvian youth have developed belief systems which 
reflect that of their grandparents’ generation.36
 
 
The newly (re)independent Latvia immediately began to enact discriminatory policy 
towards ethnic Latvians, in the guise of responding to decades of Soviet ‘Russification’. 
It remains an irony that the same justification was used to popularise Ulmanis’ interwar 
policy. Based on the concept of jus sanguinis, the right of blood, the Law on Citizenship 
1994 indicated that persons who were “Latvian citizens before June 17, 1940, and their 
descendants” are automatically entitled to citizenship.37 While the post-Soviet Latvia 
was demographically a multi-ethnic society, such citizenship law resulted in the 
homogenisation of the emerging political system.38 Anton Steen suggests this was the 
intention of the Latvian political elite. He indicates it was motivated by a need to 
“protect the national core.”39 Discriminatory legislation continued to be passed on this 
basis. The ethnically homogonous political elite continued to hold consensual attitudes 
towards such discrimination.40
                                                          
31 Sprudzs, op. cit., p.140. 
 This culminated in the passing of the 1998 education 
law, which dictated that year-ten students could only be taught in the state language of 
32 A leader of a Diaspora civil society group in Australia, Aivars Mednis described the West’s non- de jure recognition 
of Soviet rule as being “the most significant contribution” to the independence cause of Latvia and the other Baltic 
States cited in Baltic Council of Australia, 1989, p.1. 
33 Sprudzs, op. cit., p.141. 
34 A. Plakans, ‘Democratization and political participation in post communist societies: The case of Latvia’, in K. 
Dawisha & B. Parrott (eds), The consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, p.254. 
35 I. Koroleva & R. Rungule, ‘Latvia: Democracy as an abstract value’, in H. Klingermann; D. Fuchs & J. Zielonka 
(eds), Democracy and political culture in Eastern Europe, Milton Park, Routledge, 2006, p.238. 
36 Ibid., p.235. 
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, ‘Latvian citizenship’, 
<http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/service/4727/>, accessed 2 May 2008. 
38 V V. Pettai & M. Kreuzer, ‘Party politics in the Baltic States: Social bases and institutional context’, East European 
Politics & Societies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1998, p.152.   
39 A. Steen, Between past and future: Elites, democracy and the state in post-communist countries: A comparison of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997, p.86. 
40 Ibid., p.282. 
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Latvian.41 Responses to this by members of the Russian community implied that “the 
state is reliving a Nazi past in the present.”42 Placards adorning swastikas becoming a 
common feature of protest rallies by Russian speaking minorities.43
 
 The impact of 
Soviet anti-Latvian nationalism propaganda, thus still lives on today. 
European Accession as a Catalyst for Change 
 
The European integration process has had a distinct effect on the emergence of Latvian 
neo-Fascism. This has however been a paradoxical process. The lure of the common 
market, and the security that NATO promised, caused Latvia to rethink its 
discriminatory policies. While the European Union (and to a lesser extent NATO) 
accession process resulted in a minority rights dialogue being established in Latvia, 
some European Union policy has actually worked to reinforce the ethnic divide. This has 
once again manifested itself primarily through minority language policy and law. 
 
Due to warnings that the 1998 education law in its current form would hinder Latvia’s 
chances of joining the EU, it was amended to allow 40 percent of the curriculum to be 
taught in a minority language.44 As a result of this amendment, Latvia was invited to 
commence EU accession negotiations.45 NATO Secretary-General George Robertson 
indicated in 2002 that Latvia risked exclusion from the alliance because its 
discriminatory laws were not conforming to NATO’s political ideals.46 As a result of 
these external pressures, constitutional amendments were ratified in 2002. Section 114 
of the constitution now reads that “Persons belonging to ethnic minorities have the right 
to preserve and develop their language and their ethnic and cultural identity”.47
 
 The lure 
of engagement in the European Common Market and the security of the NATO alliance 
caused Latvia to adopt a less discriminatory body of law. 
European Language Policy: Reviving Latvia’s Interwar Legacy 
Again? 
 
The European Union continues to hold paradoxical attitudes towards linguistic 
diversity, including the use of minority languages. Since the 1992 ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the European Commission (the Commission) has actively promoted 
language learning, with linguistic diversity forming the cornerstone of European 
education policy.48
                                                          
41 D. J. Galbreath, ‘Still ‘treading air’? Looking at the post-enlargement challenges to democracy in the Baltic States’, 
Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2008, p.93. 
 In fact, the Commission explicitly indicates that this includes the 
42 Ibid. 
43 For example, Ibid. 
44 D. J. Galbreath, ‘European Integration through Democratic Conditionality: Latvia in the Context of Minority 
Rights', Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2006, p.93; F. Schimmelfennig, S. Engert & H. 
Knobel, ‘Costs, commitment and compliance: The impact of EU democratic conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and 
Turkey’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2003, p.513. 
45 Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, op. cit., pp.513-514. 
46 New York University School of Law, ‘Latvia - constitutional watch: East European constitutional review’, 2002, 
<http://www.law/nyu.edu/eecr/vol11num3/constitutionwatch/latvia_print.html>, accessed 17 March 2008. 
47 Latvia, Constitution of Latvia, 1922 (with amendments as at 2008). 
48 European Commission, High level group on multilingualism: Final report, 2007. 
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learning of regional or minority languages.49
 
 The Commission’s aim of linguistic 
freedom and diversity is, however, challenged by the current structure of official EU 
languages – an inflexible situation imbedded in one of the European Community’s 
foundational laws. 
From its inception, the European Union established a structure of official languages. 
Regulation 1 passed by the European Economic Community, a predecessor to the EU, 
was that “determining the languages to be used by the European Economic 
Community.” This regulation dictates that: 
 
Documents which a Member State or a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member 
State sends to institutions of the Community may be drafted in any one of the official 
languages selected by the sender. The reply shall be drafted in the same language.50
 
 
While in 1958 this initially referred to the languages of the founding members, this has 
now been expanded by a number of amendments to currently include 23 national 
languages spoken in the European Union.51
 
  
Despite an official policy of equality among the official languages of the EU, the actual 
working languages of its institutions have been a cause of tension among particular 
Member States. While the French language was historically dominant in the European 
institutions, with the gradual expansions of the European Union, English has started to 
emerge as its lingua franca.52 This is unsurprising since approximately 69 per cent of 
the European population can speak English.53 A number of protests have been made by 
German officials for being addressed in English in an official capacity.54 Thus, in an 
attempt to avoid such criticisms, many European institutions employ multiple working 
languages. These are usually English, French and German, and occasionally Spanish or 
Italian. These languages being the five most widely understood languages prior to the 
2004 expansion.55 The eastern expansion of 2004 however, caused a marked shift in 
linguistic diversity and the dominance of particular languages. Italian was no longer one 
of the top five languages spoken, rather, Russian had taken its place.56
                                                          
49 Ibid. 
 It is a strange 
irony that the Soviet ‘Russification’ process was retrospectively successful at promoting 
linguistic dominance in what is now a large part of the EU. Of the 44 per cent of the 
50 European Council, Regulation 1, Brussels, 1958, OJ L17 6.10.1958. 
51 These being, Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, 
Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish. 
See European Commission, ‘Languages of Europe’, undated, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/languages/index_en.html>, accessed 26 September 2008. 
52 U. Ammon, ‘The status of German and other languages in the European Community’, in F. Coulmas (ed.), A 
Language Policy for the European Community, Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter, 1991, p.249. 
53 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer: Europeans and their Languages, 2006, p.14. 
54 U. Ammon, ‘Language conflicts in the European Union’, International Journal of Applied Linguistics, Vol. 16, No. 
3, 2006, p.322; European Ombudsman, ‘Recommendation to the European Commission in complaint 
259/2005/(PB)GG', 2005; European Ombudsman, 'Special Report from the European Ombudsman to the European 
Parliament following the draft recommendation to the Council of the European Union in complaint 1487/2005/GG’, 
2006. 
55 Ibid., p.331. 
56 see, European Commission, Special Eurobarometer, op. cit., p.6. 
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Through its language policy, the EU holds a paradoxical stance towards minority 
languages. By not accommodating citizens to communicate with its institutions in non-
official although widely spoken languages (such as Russian), the EU claims to support 
the use and promotion of minority and non-official languages. In 1992, the Council of 
Europe adopted the European Charter for Minority Languages (the Charter). Although 
not being an initiative of the EU, the European Parliament supported and encouraged 
its Member States to ratify the Charter.58 Article 10 of the Charter indicates that public 
authorities must recognise the use of minority languages, and allow documentation and 
communications to take place between the populace and authorities in these 
languages.59
 
 This is inconsistent with the European Economic Community’s Regulation 
1. That said, the European Economic Community itself was not a signatory of this 
convention. Although a number of Member States did ratify this convention, those on 
the eastern boundaries of the community are notably absent. This is understandable 
given historic attempts by occupiers to purge them of their nationhood. 
Since Latvia’s independence and subsequent accession to the European Union, the 
ethnically Russian population has remained a large and numerically stable proportion of 
the population. The majority of the ethnic-Russian population have also maintained 
their language usage. While between 1989 and 2007 there was a slight drop in the 
Russian population of both nations, it would appear that with European integration this 
has plateaued (see Error! Reference source not found.). In 2007, national statistics 
note that in Latvia 28 per cent are ethnically Russian.60 These figures correlate closely 
with EU statistics on language usage in these states. Russian is noted as the mother 
tongue of 26 per cent of Latvian citizens.61 These statistics on language usage exclude 
those who are non-citizens, meaning that they are however, significant 
underestimations. In 2001, for example, there were 550,000 stateless people living in 




                                                          
57 Ibid. p.16. 
58 Wright, op. cit., p.188. 
59 Council of Europe, European Charter for Minority Languages, 1992, article 10. 
60 Latvijas statistika, Census data and national statistics. 
61 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer, op. cit., p.6. 
62 M. Johns, ‘ “Do As I Say, Not As I Do”: The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority Rights’, East European 
Politics and Societies, Vol. 17, No.4, 2003, p.691. 
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The emergence of supra-nationalism through the EU is often cited as representing the 
decline of the nation state.63 Indeed, a key intention of the early European integration 
project was to off-set the rivalries between competing nation-states.64 A paradox of this 
contention lies in the continued reinforcement of dominant nationalities through the EU 
structure of official languages. As a result, at a national level, minority language rights 
are often swept aside under the auspices of nationalist-driven cultural and linguistic 
homogeneity.65
 
 This is reflected in the Official Language Law of Latvia which states: 
The purpose of this law is to ensure… the maintenance of the cultural and historic 
heritage of the Latvian nation; … [and] the increased influence of the Latvian language in 
the cultural environment of Latvia, to promote a more rapid integration of society.66
 
 
                                                          
63 See for example, U. Beck & E. Grande, ‘Cosmopolitanism: Europe’s Way Out of Crisis’, European Journal of Social 
Theory, Vol.10, No.1, pp.67-86 (pp.69-70); F. Cerutti, ‘A Political Identity of the Europeans?’, Thesis Eleven, Vol. 72, 
2003, p.34-38; R. Kastoryano, ‘Citizenship: Beyond Blood and Soil’, in R. Leveau, K. Mohsen-Finan & C. Wihtol de 
Wenden (eds), New European Identity and Citizenship, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002, p.115-116; S. Huntington, The 
Clash of the Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996, p.35. 
64 D. P. Calleo, ‘Reflections on the idea of the nation-state’, in C. A. Kupchan (ed.) Nationalism and nationalities in 
the New Europe, Ithica, Cornell University Press, 1995, p.34; G. Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, 
Houndmills, Macmillan, 1995, p.27; D. Messenger, ‘Dividing Europe: The Cold War and European Integration’, in D. 
Dinan (ed.), Origins and Evolution of the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.36-39. 
65 S. May, ‘Language, Nationalism and Democracy in Europe’ in G. Hogan-Brun and S. Wolff (eds), Minority 
Languages in Europe: Frameworks, Status, Prospects, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.215. 
66 Latvia, Official Language Law, 1999, section 1. 
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This law also dictates that all other languages of the Republic of Latvia are to be 
regarded as foreign.67 Among the Copenhagen Criteria which Latvia (and other potential 
Member States) had to fulfil in the EU accession process, was that of the “protection of 
minorities.”68 This had little practical effect in Latvia. A number of writers attribute this 
to it being an ambiguous requirement.69 Despite pre-accession process negotiations 
promoting ethnic and linguistic diversity, as a result of such actions during the actual 






It remains a curious irony the European Union does not have a legal requirement to 
communicate with a large proportion of its residents in their mother tongue. Although 
this may be, in part, attributed to the rapid shift in linguistic diversity through the EU’s 
eastern expansions, the restrictions on languages through which European public 
authorities will communicate with their residents hold some core similarities to 
language restrictions under totalitarian regimes of the left and right. While on one hand, 
the EU is promoting language diversity through its minority language initiatives, on the 
other hand, the system of official languages is preventing true linguistic freedom and 
diversity from becoming a reality. In a large part, national governments, such as 
Latvia’s, are responsible for this. Although it is understandable given the historic 
attempts to destroy the Latvian nation, the insistence on homogenous nationalistic and 
protectionist language policy appears to be counter to the intentions of the European 
integration project. 
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